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This paper examines two of Maurice Blanchot's theoretical works 
Literature and The Writing of the Disaster. Blanchot has positioned himself within 
the ongoing critique of essentialism, and it is this paper's purpose to take up with 
these work's from the position of this critique and evaluate the extent to which he 
maintains the exteriority which the critique demands. 
Both of these work's are meditations on writing, and Blanchot, as a writer, is 
concerned with describing the author's relationship with the work. As this paper 
demonstrates, it is a relationship of passivity, a relationship in which the author's 
concern for the work's exteriority renders her powerless. Though this relationship 
appears faithful to the demands of this critique, it is just this concern for the work, 
concern which necessitates that the writer write, which problematizes Blanchot's 
relationship to this exteriority It is a problematicization, however, in which 
Blanchot finds the power to fulfill the demands which he thinks this exteriority, 
thought by him as disaster, commands. 
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Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space 
where our subject slips away, the negative where 
all identity is lost-
Roland Barthes 
With this statement, Barthes marks the point of separation between 
modern literature and classical or romantic literature: the rejection of 
interiority. Literature, from Homer's Odyssey to Joyce's Ulysses, has 
been defined as the exploration/revelation of man's being; as Aristotle, in 
the Poetics, put it, "...poetry is something more philosophic and of graver 
import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of 
universals, whereas those of history are singulars." 1 In this classical sense, 
literature, like philosophy, is both a source of, and a means to, Truth; 
reason may be somewhat faulty, divine aid may have to be sought, we may 
perhaps have to be aware and watchful for some affective reservoir, but 
human actions, human passions, all those things which mask, or for some 
are, a human's being, are penetrable by the light of the writer's art. This 
penetrating power, common to literature and philosophy, is most potent 
when it is turned on itself: it is the power of extreme interiorization 
which, at the same time, allows literature to escape itself, to grasp its own 
being in this flight. "Great Literature" is marked by this doubled 
movement of interiority and transcendence — the move from the fullness of 
'Aristotle, Poetics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Pt. II, Ed. by Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 145lb. 
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beings to the void of Being, from being, thought in its simple presence to 
the world, as Truth, to thinking this presence as difference, to a difference 
which: 
...in itself is self-related difference; as such, it is 
the negativity of itself, the difference not of 
another, but of itself from itself; it is not itself but 
its other. But that which is different from 
difference is identity. Difference, therefore, is 
itself and identity.2 
This is, of course, a suspicious movement; writers and thinkers alike 
have questioned the presumptions of a thought which claims to annul all 
differences and bring everything, even itself, into its penetrating gaze. 
Much of this suspicion has centered around the subject, possessor, at least 
since Descartes, of what were, at one time, qualities of the divine: pure 
presence and certitude, for example. In philosophy, the subject became the 
source of truth, ontology and metaphysics were conflated; it was no longer 
divine light, but the light of reason which penetrated to the heart of being. 
In literature, the author held the privileged position; she was the 
transcended transcending, both the creator of and created truth; the void of 
Being was not empty — it was there that the author resided. It is in 
^G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, Trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 
1969) p. 417. What I am indicating here is the sense in which the question of Being, in the 
Western intellectual tradition, has shifted from one of simple unity to one in which the very 
possibility of this unity has been predicated upon difference — the notion that, when fully 
exfoliated. Being is, in fact, an absence, a gap. 
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opposition to this tradition, with its privileging of the author, that Barthes 
is pointing when he speaks of the subject slipping away; his "neutral, 
composite, oblique space" rejects the transcending interiority of the author, 
rejects her power. Barthes gives a first indication of the exteriority which 
is modern literature's rejection of interiority — a literature from which the 
subject is excluded, which recognizes a fundamental difference between the 
transcendence of language and the identity, in interiority, of the 
author/self: a language, then, which is no longer discourse, no longer 
communication, but a spreading forth of pure exteriority. We must be 
cautious, however; Hegel has warned us of the dangers of strict 
oppositions, of their tendency to hide or enable a deeper unity. We must 
not think of exteriority as the binary opposite of interiority; in this sense, 
the exterior, like Hegel's difference, would merely be disguised, potential, 
unity. Rather, we must begin to think of an outside without an inside, an 
exteriority which is "the outside 'preceding' every interior".3 Modern 
literature is not the ceaseless exploration of language as language, the 
constant delving into the being of language, but language fleeing from itself 
— a passage to the exterior, a passage which reveals, not being, but a gap. 
This is a language without a subject, a transcendence without an interior. 
Still, this language of the exterior, and the writing which witnesses 
it, is not without its dangers; both interiority and exteriority have a certain 
gravity — a certain irresistibility. It is this power of the tradition which 
^Maurice Blanchot, L'Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969) p. 625. Translated in Mark 
C. Taylor, Altaritx, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987.) p. 235. I am heavily 
indebted to this excellent book. 
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writers and thinkers have found so suspicious — it is also this power which 
the witnesses of the exterior have found difficult to escape. The 
structuralism of Barthes, suspicious as it was of interiority, failed to 
completely escape its gravity. Though, as he says, "It is hardly possible 
any longer to conceive of literature as an art that abandons all further 
relation with language the moment it has used it as an instrument to express 
ideas, passion or beauty," he remains committed to the idea that language, 
through its own working, reveals itself as its being as a possibility, "...does 
not literature, particularly today, make a language of the very conditions of 
language?"/* This self conciousness, which is one of the key characteristics 
of modernity in art as well as philosophy, indicates the extent to which, 
though critical of classical thought, Barthes cannot evade the tradition of 
interiority. The thought of at least the past one hundred years can be read 
as the history of the attempt to escape the interiorizing influences of the 
metaphysical tradition; attempts which, for the most part, failed, and 
continue, necessarily to fail. For, it is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to find a language faithful to exteriority — a burden which the 
writer feels sharply. The writer works with a language which has, at its 
roots, the tradition of interiority — a language which the writer of the 
exterior must allow to escape itself; a language which, "...seeks to liberate 
itself from the Greek domination of the same and the one (other names for 
the light of Being).Anyone who works with language (at least the 
^Roland Barthes, "Structural Analysis of Narratives" in Image - Music - Text, Trans, by 
Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977) p. 85. 
-^Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," from Writing and Difference. Trans, by 
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languages of the West) must unavoidably work with the tradition of 
interiority; it is this inescapable pervasiveness which is the first danger the 
interior poses to exteriority. 
There is more to the problem, however, than the metaphysical roots 
of language; the gravity of the interior extends beyond words to the forms 
that these words take. There is a tendency to make of exteriority merely a 
disguised interiority — to cast the exterior in terms of the body, the will 
and presence to the other. A purely reflective discourse, for example, runs 
this risk of re-interiorization; reflection has always been a mode of 
consciousness, a mode of the interior. This is particularly true of fiction, 
which, with its cast of ready made allusions and descriptive tools, makes of 
exteriority merely another mode of subjectivity. This is true, as well, of 
the book, which, with its beginning and its end, with its ordered 
presentation, implies completion, systematicity and encirclement: 
This is the circular requirement. Being deploys 
itself as movement turning in a circle and this 
movement goes from the most interior to the most 
exterior, from undeveloped interiority to 
exteriorization that alienates it and from this 
alienation that externalizes it until plenitude is 
attained and re-interiorized.6 
Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978) p. 83-
^Blanchot, L'Entretien infini, p. 19. in Taylor, p. 222. 
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The gravity of the book, its deadly seriousness, is the gravity of the 
interior; the inescapably metaphysical character of the word continues in 
the expressive forms of language. We have not, however, reached a limit; 
the danger to the witnessing of the exterior does not end with the 
dominating tendencies of the metaphysics of interiority. 
For, exteriority has its own gravity, a certain tendency towards the 
interior. There is a certain attractive seriousness to exteriority, as well as a 
seductive playfulness, both of which can lead to an ecstatic re-
interiorization on the presence of this absence: 
To write is to enter into the affirmation of the 
solitude in which fascination threatens...it is to 
stay in touch with language, in language, with the 
absolute milieu where the thing becomes image 
again, where the image, instead of alluding to 
some particular feature, becomes an allusion to 
the featureless, and instead of a form drawn upon 
absence, becomes the formless presence of this 
absence. .J 
Blanchot describes a response to the gravity of the interior, the gravity of 
an image which is supposed to re-present truth to the reader; he also 
indicates the dangers which this response runs. One of these is the " 
playfulness which the transparency of the image encourages. It is not 
playfulness in itself which is the danger, it is a certain inactive playfulness 
"^Blanchot, The Space of Literature, Trans, by Ann Smock (Lincoln: The University of 
Nebraska Press, 1982) p. 33-
which is the only answer to the seriousness of the metaphysical; however, 
fascination with the absence of exteriority invites a certain non-
productivity — not an inactivity but a careless circulation, a pushing of 
exteriority to its limits. There is a sense in which this careless flirtation 
with the absence of this absence can collapse upon itself. Deleuze and 
Guattari describe the movement to the exterior, away from the 
centeredness of the interior, as "deterritorialization:" 
...what happens under conditions of precocious or 
extremely sudden deterritorialization...the 
machine then produces "individual" group effects 
spinning in circles, as in the case of chaffinches 
that have been isolated too early, whose 
impoverished, simplified song expresses nothing 
more than the resonance of the black hole in 
which they are trapped.8 
Absence attracts us, daring us to try to fill it with the empty excrescence of 
form, an overabundance of signification. It is this tendency towards 
extreme, destructive deterritorialization, this rush outwards which ends by 
collapsing inwards, which is the result of this careless playfulness. 
Exteriority shimmers; its weightlessness beckoned Sade and Bataille, 
Artaud and Robbe-Grillet, despisers all of the seriousness of traditional 
thought. Yet, the transcendence of language as pure exteriority has its own 
^Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) p. 334. 
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seriousness; a seriousness necessary to avoid the re-interiorization which 
the ecstasy of absence can provoke as well as a seriousness which all too 
much resembles the seriousness of the tradition. The image, in its position 
as the marker of absence, makes demands of us. This is the experience of 
the need to write which, while perhaps recognizing that activity is a mode 
of interiority, cannot but forget the necessary inactivity of the exterior. 
There is a tendency to re-interiorize on the absence of the exterior which 
springs not from carelessness but from Le souci de Voeuvre : 
Writing begins only when it is the approach to 
that point where nothing reveals itself, where, at 
the heart of dissimulation, speaking is an 
imaginary language and a language of the 
imaginary, the one nobody speaks, the murmur of 
the incessant and interminable which one has to 
silence if one wants, at last, to be heard.9 
There is a certain violence at work in the need to write, an unceasing 
demand and an irresistible affirmation — an impotence which is, at the 
same time, powerful and transgressive. It is this need to be heard, this 
seriousness, which poses the gravest danger to the witnessing of the 
exterior. 
It is in spite of these dangers, and perhaps because of them, that 
Maurice Blanchot writes. His work, benefiting from the doubled 
^Blanchot, The Space of Literature, p. 41. 
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movement of fiction and theory while refusing to distinguish sharply 
between the two, is the attempt to witness this exteriority, an attempt which 
is characterized by what Levinas has described as "a language of pure 
transcendence." He is a writer keenly aware of the dangers of this 
witnessing; in fact, he makes of this danger the possibility of writing. It is 
thus, at this site of 'pure transcendence,' that both the movement to and the 
danger of the exterior are most evident. This paper proposes to examine 
two of Blanchot's theoretical works, The Space of Literature and The 
Writing of the Disaster, taking up with these works at the places crucial to 
the development of Blanchot's "thought of the outside," and 
demonstrating, while attempting to remain faithful to the needs of the 
outside, that it is at these places of greatest exteriority that Blanchot's work 
necessarily 10 re-interiorizes itself. This is not to privilege the theoretical 
expression of Blanchot's thought (a privileging which Blanchot himself 
prevents with his convergence of literature and theory), however, the vast, 
unruly body of Blanchot's work, as well as the scope of this project, 
necessitate that I limit it myself in some way. 
• OAs will become more explicit, this is the necessity of "the one who needs to write." 
I 
The image, capable of negating nothingness, is 
also the gaze of nothingness on us. The image is 
light, and nothingness is immensely heavy. The 
image shines and nothingness is the diffuse 
thickness where nothing reveals itself. The image 
is the crack, the mark of this black sun, the tear 
{dechirure }, which, under the appearance of the 
dazzling burst {eclat }, gives us the negative of 
the inexhaustible negative depth. That is why the 
image seems so profound and so empty, so 
threatening and so attractive, always rich in more 
senses that we lend it, and also poor, void and 
silent, because in it advances this dark impotence, 
deprived of mastery, which is that of death as 
recommencement. 1 1 
It is to avoid the power of the image to negate absence, a power which we 
saw in the discussion of language's metaphysical character and in the false 
exteriority of reflective narrative, that Blanchot turns to the outside. A 
turning away from the certitude of the interior, to the outside where 
language, fleeing from itself, runs into itself at the limits of its possibility. 
This collision marks the point, not of a Hegelian self-contradiction,with its 
attendant Aufhebung, but of the void. It is to this void that language 
moves, negating itself, casting itself outside of itself into the silence of the 
outside. Not the silence of the death camps, but the silence of what cannot 
be silenced; not reflection, but forgetting; not contradiction, but the burst 
l ^Blanchot, L'Ami tie, (Paris: Gallimard, 1971) Trans, by Taylor in Altaritv, p. 229. 
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which, with its empty light, effaces; not the self in its constant quest for 
unity, but the impotence of the void; not language, then, revealing itself in 
its own light, as Truth, but the 'Errant Word' which is a "language which 
makes nothing heard." 12 Blanchot's work speaks to the void created by 
language's movement outside of itself; speaks to, while speaking outside of, 
this absence. The discourse formed by this ceaseless undoing has no truth, 
no center; yet, as discourse that is always outside of what it says, this work 
incessantly moves to the ambiguous hollowness of its undoing as origin — 
language about the outside of all language. It is a discourse, then, of 
attentiveness to what in language already exists, has already been said; an 
attentiveness not to what is being said, but to the void circulating between 
words, to the murmur that is its incessant self-undoing. 
Blanchot's theoretical work is this attentiveness. In both The Space 
of Literature and The Writing of the Disaster, Blanchot asks the question: 
"What is it about the void, about 'the inexhaustible negative depth' of 
language, about the disaster, that moves, and in a sense compels, a person 
to write?" He asks the question without answering it, asks it in such a way, 
and for the purpose of making it such, that it cannot be answered. There is 
a difference between these two books, however, in the way that Blanchot 
fails to answer the question; a difference which marks the space of 
Blanchot's theoretical meditations. The Space of Literature is perhaps the 
most bookish of Blanchot's texts; Blanchot goes so far as to bow to the 
necessity of the book, and its ever-accompanying methodological discourse, 
^Blanchot, Spate, p. 51. 
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by beginning it with a brief prefatory remark indicating its thematic 
center, while, at the same time, denying this center any real presence. 13 
This is not, of course, to say that The Space of Literature falls easily prey 
to the obscene attraction of interiority; on the contrary, Blanchot's 
meditations here, as in the fictional and critical work which preceded it, 
are necessarily sensitive to the demands of witnessing exteriority. 
However, as Ann Smock, in her introduction to her translation of The 
Space of Literature indicates, though Blanchot's object of concern 
necessitates unconcern, an inactivity (a necessity which the work in no way 
fails,) "...L'Espace litteraire retains plenty of the outward signs of 
straightforward discussion." 14 This straightforwardness takes the form of 
a certain definitiveness toward the non-answering of the work's central 
questions, all of which circulate around the fundamental demand of the 
rupture that is language. Blanchot, of course, does not presume to answer 
these questions; however, he does move purposefully to the site of their 
final incomprehensibility, presuming a certain insightful, if not definitive, 
position on its horizon. 
This definitiveness disappears in The Writing of the Disaster, to be 
replaced by a text whose fractured, aphoristic form indicates the probable 
impossibility, but at least problematicity, of any approach, beside 
'•^The preface, of course, is an indication of both the power and the failure of interiority 
and the Book. The preface, starting on the outside of the text, is reappropriated by the text 
as its surplus negativity: a re-appropriation which always fails, (cf. Jacques Derrida, 
Dissemination (University of Chicago Press, 1981) and Of Gramatology (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976)). 
^Space. p. 5. 
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language's itself, to the void. In this work, the writing, fractured, 
tortured, bent beyond itself, attempts to show, rather than to describe, 
language's movement outside. Thus, The Writing of the Disaster marks a 
confluence in Blanchot's work between the fictional and the theoretical; 
never fully distinct, the difference now becomes indeterminable. Blanchot 
takes up the same questions concerning the possibility of writing which 
were the project of The Space of Literature ; yet here, in a distinction 
which indicates the influence of Emmanuel Levinas and Edmond Jabes, 
Blanchot shifts his discussion of the void to what he calls 'disaster.' This 
shift, which will be discussed at greater length later, undermines any 
attempt at analysis, no matter how indeterminate. All that is left, in the 
facelessness of the disaster, is writing, a writing which the disaster makes 
an impossibility, "The disaster, unexperienced. It is what escapes the very 
possibility of experience — it is the limit of writing...the disaster de­
scribes."^ The disaster is the outside of any exteriority; there is no 
approach to it which the disaster does not render void and silent. This 
silencing power is not. of course, foreign to the analysis of The Space of 
Literature; however, Blanchot, in The Writing of the Disaster, is more 
acutely aware of the dangers the disaster poses to writing. 
It is, however, exactly because of The Space of Literature's 
bookishness, its tendency towards the determinate, that I am concentrating 
on it; it is here that the gravity of the exterior, and those places where 
Blanchot's language succumbs to its interiorizing pull, are most evident. In 
^Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster (Lincoln, The University of Nebraska Press, 
1986) p. 7. 
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a sense, the aphoristic style of The Writing of the Disaster makes any such 
concentration impossible; any discussion of the work would be forced to 
remain as fragmented as the work itself is. This is not, however, to ignore 
the more careful treatment of the writer's relationship to the void in The 
Writing of the Disaster.; here, also, there are moments of re-interiorization. 
This should come as no surprise; in both works, Blanchot is ultimately 
concerned, as a writer, to leave space for writing. Unfortunately, though 
this is an important, even necessary, task, it cannot resist the attraction of 
the interior. This is not to suggest, however, that I have completed these 
works — determined their meaning in some way from outside of them. 
Both works are so densely exterior to their object, so richly transcendent, 
that they evade any attempt, even their own, to complete them in this way. 
To read either of these works is to follow it outside of itself into an 
exteriority from which no critical distance, no privileged insight is 
possible. Thus, I am limiting myself to discussing only a few concerns of 
these works; points where Blanchot runs patiently, even joyously, into the 
limits of his own thought. 
Solitude and Inertia The Outside 
1 5  
Solitude is dangerous: it has the power of madness. From the 
benign ego-mania of the solipsist, to the treacherous, consuming madness 
of solitary confinement, solitude presents a threat to the integrity of 
consciousness. Perhaps it is for this reason that Blanchot begins The Space 
of Literature with solitude. He begins not with the agonizing solitude of 
the prisoner, the deluded solitude of the solipsist, nor even the solitude of 
the artist, the concentration necessary to the production of a work; but 
rather, the very solitude of the work itself, its indeterminacy as being, 
"...the work — the work of art, the literary work — is neither finished nor 
unfinished: it is." 16 The being of the work, then, is just this expression of 
its own unfinished, unfinishable existence. In an assertion which evidences 
the conjunction of Heidegger and Bataille in his thought, Blanchot says that 
the work works to the extent to which it proclaims this indefiniteness, this 
terrible, solitary absence — works, then, by not working. This should not 
surprise us, production has always been a mode of the interior; it is the 
possibility of rationality, "Reason is bound up with work and the 
purposeful activity that incarnates its laws." 17 jn a meditation on the 
writer and his relation to the work's exteriority, Blanchot must reject the 
notion of a fruitful essence of the work, suggesting instead the solitude and 
^Space, p. 22. 
'^Georges Bataille, Erotism, Death and Sensuality (San Francisco: City Lights Books 
1986) p. 168. 
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inactivity of the void. 
The work has no center, no self, and, likewise, no other; the author 
belongs to it only in its beginning when it is merely a book, a collection of 
words, the reader only to the extent that he affirms its solitude, its 
otherness. This solitude is not, thus, limited to the work, Blanchot points 
to the work's incomprehensibility to the author, the Noli Me Legere , to 
indicate that this solitude is shared by the writer — not as partners, but as 
an absence which, when the author recognizes it, commands her. The 
work, escaping the author in its solitary being, leaves her alone at the 
beginning, leaves her with nothing left to do but try once again to approach 
the work's being. This is a solitude which is not mere concentration, but 
the solitude of belonging, "to the shadow of events, not their reality, to the 
image, not the object, to what allows words themselves to become images, 
appearances — not signs, values, the power of truth." 18 Opposed to the 
being of the work, a being which, as absence, is not a positivity, is the 
solitude of the writer, a negative, but a negative without a positive. An 
opposition then, but it is also a connection — not as a sublated difference, 
but as a solitary relationship to the solitude of language. It is from this 
relationship between solitudes that Blanchot begins to approach literature's 
space, the outside. 
The solitude of the work, and thus, as it is the work's movement 
outside which constitutes her solitude, the solitude of the author, reveals 
itself, for Blanchot, in the author's inability to stop writing; the solitude of 
^Spacc, p. 24. 
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the beginning, the presence of the work's absence, is the solitude of a 
ceaseless beginning over. Writing somehow escapes the writer; the 
authority of the author, the power assigned her by the tradition of 
interiority to express herself determinately and with certitude — to create 
value — disappears in the indeterminacy of the work: 
What he is to write delivers the one who has to 
write to an affirmation over which he has no 
authority, which is itself without substance, which 
affirms nothing...!9 
The work commands us: the artistry of the writer, her command of 
language and her style, do not give her control over the work; if anything, 
such attempts at control emphasize, with their necessary incompleteness, 
their endless 'maybe it would be better if...,' the indeterminacy of the 
work, and, thus, the incessantness of the writer's task. In the face of the 
work's empty affirmation, the endless surplus of the work, the author 
looses the ability to do anything other than surrender to the work's 
movement. This must not be understood as a surrender to the work as 
essence, surrender to the work as movement inward to the realm of pure 
thought; but a realization, with its incessant beginning-over, of the 
movement outward into indeterminacy, into excess of the work; a 
movement in the face of which only passivity is possible — a passivity in 
l^Ibid., p. 24-
18 
which the presence of the "I" disappears, leaving only the indefiniteness of 
the third person. 
It becomes possible to describe a certain physics of solitude, a time 
and space of the outside;20 a physics not of closed systems, and not even of 
the bounded indeterminacy of non-linear systems, but an anti-physics, a 
physics of the exterior which circulates around, without circumscribing, 
the work's flight outward. This is not of course to suggest a certain 
closure to Blanchot's description of the work in its indeterminacy; rather, 
it is an attempt to examine the paradoxical relations between the solitary 
work, in its absence, and its activity as a certain affirming presence, a 
relation which is always already impossible. As part of this non-physics, 
we can discuss the work in terms of a certain non-temporality, a 
temporality of disaster. 
The movement of the work outside marks the end of time, 
understood as the condition for the possibility of doing work; the time of 
time's absence is the time in which nothing is done, in which no work is 
possible. Yet, this ending of time, an ending which is both a result and the 
mark of the work's absence, is also the time of the work in its immanence 
as being, is the time of the work's empty affirmation as that which is only 
as unfinished and unfinishable — absent. Thus, this absent time indicates 
the negativity of the work's positivity. the fundamental worklessness of the 
work's affirmation, the work's being as absence; as well as the positivity of 
2^1 do not want to make too much of this metaphor, which, like all metaphors, is limited to 
a binary logic. However, such a binarism is suggested by Blanchot's discussion of the 
problem. This is, in fact, a feature of this work's determinateness. 
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the work's negativity, the incessantly non-productive re-approach to the 
work — the work's absence as a certain presence. Though this reversal 
appears to be a movement of Hegelian relation, a sublating of differences 
(absence and presence) to a greater unity (absence as presence), it is in fact 
a rejection of any such dialectical re-interiorization: 
The reversal which, in time's absence, points us 
constantly back to the presence of absence — but 
to this presence as absence, to absence as its own 
affirmation (an affirmation in which nothing is 
affirmed, in which nothing ever ceases to affirm 
itself with the exhausting insistence of the 
indefinite) — this movement is not dialectical. 
Contradictions do not exclude each other in it; nor 
are they reconciled.21 
There is no sense, then, in which the disastrous time of the work's 
oscillation between its impossibility-to-work and its incessant working is 
the time of the work's unity, of its ultimate possibility. The temporality of 
the disaster is this time of unreconciled contradiction, the time in which the 
work's absence is as an activity and in which the affirmation of its being is 
as silence and the void. It is the necessary before of the work: the halting, 
never begun time of the work's absent presence, the outside. 
This absent time is the time of what Blanchot calls "the central 
point," the non-place where the work, in its ceaseless flight from itself, 
2 ̂  Space, p. 30. 
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displays itself as absent; there is also, then, a spatiality of the work's 
solitude. The space of the work, in this first approximation, is not a space 
at all, rather, it is the presence of the work, its affirmation, which, as we 
have seen, is always as absence. The work, then, is a movement between 
the outside, language in its unfolding, and the always absent world; as well 
as the movement of the language itself between its absent presence and its 
presence as absence: 
One would like to say that the [work], like the 
pendulum that marks the time of time's 
abolition...oscillates marvelously between its 
presence as language and the absence of things in 
the world. But this presence is itself oscillating 
perpetuity: oscillation between the successive 
unreality of terms that terminate nothing, and the 
total realization of this movement...22 
The work's space is marked by this ceaseless movement, the incessant 
immanence of language on the void of the world which is in fact an 
immanence of nothingness. Constant movement, but no production — 
interplays of force, but no work. This is inertia; though the central point is 
"the mark of the black sun, which, under the appearance of the dazzling 
burst," presents being in its brilliance: 
...we must also comprehend and feel that this 
22lbid., p. 45. Additions mine. 
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point renders the work impossible, because it 
never permits arrival at the work. It is a region 
anterior to the beginning where nothing is made 
of being, and in which nothing is accomplished. 
It is the depths of being's inertia 
\desoeuvrement J.23 
The space of the work's solitude, then, is the space in which the work, as 
work, becomes impossible. The space of the work — that through which it 
moves and to which it approaches — is the outside; "the inexhaustible 
negative depth" which is, at the same absent time, the point where the 
work, in its flight from itself, finally, fatally, escapes itself into its own 
disappearance as pure exteriority, and the point where this flight, through 
its own inertia, ends before it begins. This is, then, the non-space of the 
work's solitude, the space where the movement to the exterior of the work 
and the inertia of the work's empty being oscillate endlessly. As of yet, 
however, what we have, with reservations, called the physics of solitude 
remains only half articulated; as was noted before, the work has a partner 
in its solitude. 
It is now time to return to the author, waiting patiently at the work's 
beginning — before even the work's before, before its possibility as 
impossibility. It would be misleading, however, to attempt to extend the 
physical metaphor of the work's solitude to make room for the writer; 
rather, we must begin to consider, with Blanchot, the author's response to 
this solitude. As we saw, the movement outside of the work leaves the 
23lbid., p. 46. 
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writer with nothing but an acquiescence to the work's incessantness. This 
is not to suggest, however, that the author has no relation to this 
movement; in fact, the solitude of the work makes certain demands on the 
writer, makes her into "the one who has to write." The passivity of the 
author is not a complete inactivity, or rather, it is an inactive, unproductive 
activity, an activity which, in its sheer excessiveness, makes itself 
impossible. In one sense, at least, this is obvious; it is the incessant return 
to the work of the writer, even though limited to the book, to a collection 
of words, which is the work's possibility. However, there is a certain 
exertion of power by the author that, with the work, precedes this 
possibility; even in the incessantness of the work's affirmation, even with 
the loss of the "I." the author still writes: 
To write is to make oneself the echo of what 
cannot cease speaking — and since it cannot, in 
order to become its echo I have, in a way. to 
silence it. I bring to the incessant speech the 
decisiveness, the authority of my silence.24 
For Blanchot, in order to write, in order to stand testament to the work's 
affirmation, the author needs to make of his silence a certain mastery over 
the absence of the work. Of course, this is not the mastery of the "I." the 
domination of the irreduciblv other by the self; it is, instead, the mastery of 
the third person, a mastery possible only in the author's anonymity. The 
2 4Ibid„ p. 27. 
23 
movement of the work outside leaves the author voiceless, selfless; what is 
left commands, in silence, for silence — for a ceasing of the incessant in 
which she who has to write, can write. 
The demand of the work in its exteriority, then, is that the writer be 
this commanding echo, that she use this power to silence what cannot be 
silenced; what needs to be worked through is that which necessitates the 
power of the author: the need to write. For Blanchot, the need to write is 
a certain fascination with the site and the time of the work's absence. It is 
the outside of the work, the end of time which, in its always before, is the 
impossibility of any presence, which depersonalizes the author, rendering 
him selfless and fascinated. The dead time of the work is the time of 
solitude, the time of the impersonal: 
The fact of being alone is my belonging to this 
dead time which is not my time, or yours, or the 
time we share in common, but Someone's 
time...Where I am alone, 1 am not there; no one is 
there, but the impersonal is: the outside, as that 
which prevents, precedes and dissolves the 
possibility of any personal relation.25 
It is to this solitude, the solitude of the absent time which she experiences as 
the impersonal, that the author turns, fascinated. For it is at that "always 
then," the disastrous time of the work, that language's inertia reigns, that 
25lbid.,  p.  31. 
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words, having the power to make things "arise" at the heart of their 
absence, also have the power to disappear in it themselves. The "central 
point" of the work is also, then, a distance, the space of the work's presence 
as absence; it is this distance which is the possibility of fascination: 
Whoever is fascinated doesn't see, properly 
speaking, what he sees. Rather, it touches him in 
an immediate proximity...even though it leaves 
him absolutely at a distance...Fascination is the 
relation the gaze entertains — a relation which is 
neutral and impersonal — with sightless, shapeless 
depth, the absence one sees because it is 
blinding.26 
What fascinates the writer is the doubled attraction of the image, its rich 
profundity which appears, at the same time, as shining and black, as 
immediate and limitlessly distant, as presence and the void; fascination, 
then, with language itself. Yet, as Blanchot points out, fascination is not 
merely a distant pre-occupation; rather, it "touches [the author] in an 
immediate proximity" establishing a certain connection, a relation which, 
though neutral and impersonal, still obscures its own distance — an 
obscuring which, in the case of the author's fascination with the outside, 
establishes a connection of demand and response which silences language, 
which, rendering the work impossible, ceaselessly reinforces itself. 
This relation bears attention, for it is this circle of absence and 
26Ibid„ p.33. Additions mine. 
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fascination which is both the possibility and the gravity of writing. For 
Blanchot, the absence of the work, an absence which, importantly as we 
shall see, he links with death, is that which brings the writer to write. It is 
not from some naivete concerning her ability to bridge the gap of Being, to 
give some form to absence, that the writer writes; rather, it is just the 
depth of this gap, its inexhaustibility, which draws the writer forth. The 
writer writes only to the extent that she "already belongs to the work's 
requirements,"27 already belongs to the disastrous time and space of the 
work. This already belonging is fascination, a fascination which draws the 
author ever back to the beginning of the work; an incessant return which, 
in its impossibility, emphasizes the work's absence. Thus we see the depth 
of the work's demand, and the author's passive reinforcement of it. 
Fascinated with the absence of the work, drawn by the demand of this 
absence, the author approaches the work, an approach which the work's 
absence renders impossible. Yet, this very impossibility merely emphasizes 
the demand, making the return of the writer to the work's beginning ever 
more necessary , while, at the same time, making it ever more impossible. 
At this point, however, I can do nothing more than sketch this circle; I will 
return to it after a closer discussion of Blanchot's notion of the demand and 
the writer's response. 
Before the beginning is the writer, not the word, not even the book 
which is always already nothing, the writer, re-turning incessantly to the 
non-time of the non-space of the work's movement outside; fascinated, 
27Ibid., p. 47. 
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connected to the work by a demand which, with its catalytic relation to the 
transcendence of the work, propels herself deeper into, but ever farther 
from, the void. We thus begin to follow Blanchot to the outside, 
recognizing the extent to which his description of the work's solitude 
remains a faithful witness to the exterior's demand. Instead of describing 
writing as the perhaps endless, but ever hopeful, approximation to Truth, 
Blanchot offers a ceaseless, and despairing, return to a never achievable 
central point; a point which, even were the approach possible, offers 
nothing but the infinitely deep void. Instead of a movement inside, a 
movement marked by the penetrating power of reason, the grand 
dialectical dance of identity and difference, by a faithful productivity, he 
suggests a trajectory which, having no beginning, aims at that which has no 
end, no closure, no value as truth: the outside. He offers, then, a 
description, not of the Book, but of the work, of the space where language, 
murmuring interminably, spreads itself forth. 
Similarly, in opposition to the traditional notion of the author as the 
enlightened and enlightening subjectivity residing at the center of the 
work's being, Blanchot describes a writer shorn of his self, rendered 
nameless, by the passivity of the work's flight; a sheering which, in the 
incessantness of the author's return, is a self-mutilation, "This act of self-
destruction is in every respect similar to the ever so strange event of 
suicide which, precisely, gives to the supreme instant of Igitur all its 
truth."28 in the passivity of the author, Blanchot describes a writer 
28fbid., p. 43. The relation of death to the work, as 1 noted above, will be explored in 
greater detail later. 
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faithful to the needs of the outside, who, rejecting the interiorizing pull of 
Literature, remains faithful to the point of self-destruction. Even that non­
productive activity which is for Blanchot the act of writing, the author's 
response to the work's demand, remains, at least at first glance, true to the 
outside. For Blanchot, to speak of a writer's style, to speak of her mastery 
and concern for language, is to speak of the extent to which the writer 
acquiesces to the demand of language: 
When we admire the tone of a work, when we 
respond to its tone as to its most authentic aspect, 
what are we referring to? Not to style...but to 
this silence precisely, this vigorous force by 
which the writer, having been deprived of 
himself, having renounced himself, has in this 
effacement nevertheless maintained the authority 
of a certain power: the power decisively to be 
still so that in this silence what speaks without 
beginning or end might take on form, coherence 
and sense.29 
The traditional categories of Literature, its structure and form, its 
characteristics and thematics, its creators, are all rendered void by the 
outside. It is to this void, the void which the outside is and that which it 
leaves behind, that Blanchot is returned, not to interrogate, or to discover 
Truth, but to witness; to witness the shared solitude of the work and the 
one whose self has been stripped by the work's solitude, and to witness the 
29Ibid., p. 27. 
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demand the work makes of this anonymous She, the demand that 
incessantly calls her back to the work's beginning. 
It is a witnessing that continues in The Writing of the Disaster, 
instead of a physics of solitude, we have a writing of solitude, the solitude 
of the fragmented and the fragmentary. A writing, then, in which the very 
writing itself speaks of the work's solitary, effacing power; as well as its 
inescapable demand, "To read, to write, the way one lives under the 
disaster: exposed to the passivity that is outside passion...It is not you who 
will speak; let the disaster speak in you..."30 Yet, despite this shift away 
from determination to the empty immanence of the disaster, here, as in The 
Space of Literature, Blanchot, as a writer, is forced to make certain 
concessions to the needs of the writer; concessions which, as I hope to 
demonstrate, necessarily re-interiorize on the absence of the work. These 
concessions are not merely formal; the extent, for example, to which, as 
Derrida points out, even fragmentary writing, "like the ellipsis - the 'I say 
practically nothing and take it back right away' - makes mastery over all 
that goes unsaid possible, arranging in advance for all the continuities and 
supplements to come."31 Rather, it is the demand of the work itself which 
necessitates this movement inside, a demand the writer feels as a certain 
need for control, a need to silence the interminable, a demand which, as we 
saw above, feeds on itself by propelling the absent center of the work 
farther and farther outside — a farther and farther which serves to make 
30Disaster, p. 4. 
3 'Derrida, Spurs (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979) p. 93. 
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the writer's power more necessary, more complete, "Thus, writing 
continues by discontinuity; it is the lure of silence which, in very absence, 
has already delivered us to the disastrous return."32 
As in The Space of Literature, Blanchot, in The Writing of the 
Disaster, speaks of the work in terms of a certain site and time of the 
disaster. Speaks of them by speaking through them; each of the passages of 
this work are both bound and transgressed33 by the disaster's absent time 
and place. For, 'writing the disaster' is both the means by which the 
disaster, the outside, is attested to and the means by which it writes itself — 
writes itself by rendering any attempt at witnessing it impossible. The 
space and time of the disaster are, thus, solitary; a solitude which, as we 
saw in The Space of Literature, leaves the writer alone while at the same 
time refusing her the solace of solitude by exposing her to absence and 
commanding her concern: 
But the disaster is unknown; it is the unknown 
name for that in thought which dissuades us from 
thinking it, leaving us, by its proximity, alone. 
Alone, and thus exposed to the thought of the 
disaster which disrupts solitude and overflows 
every variety of thought, as the intense, silent and 
disastrous affirmation of the outside.34 
Disaster, p. 56. 
^Understood, with Bataille, as the formalized violation of an ineluctable law. 
34 D isaster, p. 5. 
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Once again, then, we see that the absence of the work, its disastrous 
presence, demands of the author a certain effort, not to produce perhaps, 
but to witness; a witnessing which, in The Space of Literature , took the 
form of a certain silencing power, and which, in The Writing of the 
Disaster, Blanchot describes as interruption. 
There seems to be an important distinction between these two 
characterizations, a distinction which mirrors the more careful treatment 
of the relation of the writer to the absent work in The Writing of the 
Disaster. Blanchot's description of the writer's need to silence the 
incessantness of the work has the character of a definitive act; it is as if the 
writer, invited by the work's absent being, inserts herself in what would 
otherwise be the uninterrupted flight outward of language: 
Being very sensitive to this invitation, Thomas' 
first movement was to obey by hurrying forth 
into empty space, then, when silence had 
enveloped the call once more, he was no longer so 
sure of having really heard his name, and he 
contented himself with listening expectantly, 
hoping that someone would call him again.35 
Like doubting Thomas, the author, in The Space of Literature, is called 
outward into the work's absence, called into silence, to silence language's 
murmuring And yet, as Thomas's movement shows, this demand takes the 
^Blanchot, Thomas The Obscure, Translated by R. Lamberton (New York: David Lewis, 
1 9 7 3 )  p .  3 1 .  
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form of a plea, a plea which the author, always unsure of having heard, 
must nevertheless respond to. It is this plea which is emphasized by 
Blanchot in The Writing of the Disaster. In this text, the demand of the 
work is not so much for the author to be an interruption as to be a witness 
to the interruption which the disaster is: 
The interruption of the incessant: this is the 
distinguishing characteristic of fragmentary 
writing: interruption's having somehow the same 
meaning as that which does not cease. Both are 
effects of passivity. Where power does not reign 
— nor initiative, nor the cutting edge of a decision 
— there, dying is a l iving.36 
The difference, then, is in a certain attention to the writer's passivity: a 
shift from the author's necessary inattentiveness in the work's absent being 
which is transgressed, opened and, in a sense, empowered by this absence, 
to a passivity which, exposed to the interminable, stands as a commanding 
witness not only to the absence of the work, but to the extent to which it is 
the work itself, in its very excessiveness, which is this absence. 
Yet, this difference seems merely to be one of articulation; the 
emphasis placed on "the break which the uninterrupted, the unbroken, 
is"^ though perhaps expressed here with a greater indeterminacy, is not 
36Disaster, p. 21. 
^^Ann Smock, in her translator's introduction to The Writing of the Disaster, p. ix. 
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foreign to the treatment of the question in The Space of Literature. As was 
discussed above, the time and space of the outside is the empty before of 
the unreconciled contradiction of a certain empty presence in absence. 
Here, as in The Writing of the Disaster, the interruption of the incessant is 
both the writer's interruption of the ceaseless spreading forth of language 
and the absence which this spreading forth, in its emptiness, is: in both of 
these work's, a certain necessary activity is suggested for the author. Thus, 
despite this more careful expression of the writer's response to the work's 
demand, if, as I have suggested, Blanchot, feeling the necessity to reserve 
for the author some space in literature, moves away from the outside to the 
interior, there is no indication that The Writing of the Disaster does not 
also leaves the writer this room. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the problem has been decided. 
As of yet, the demand of the work, and the author's response to it, have 
only been provisionally discussed. It is now necessary to move closer to 
what Blanchot indicates is the center of The Space of Literature , the 
experience of Orpheus, to continue the discussion of these topics. A 
movement which will bring into the discussion Blanchot's notion of the 
work's relationship to death, as well as that witnessing which is appropriate 
to it. For it is with this notion that Blanchot hopes to avoid the obscene 
gravity of the work's demand and the need to write. 
The Work's Demand and the Author 
33 
The approach to the outside, the work's flight and the author's 
despairing return, is the approach to the night, "Whoever devotes himself 
to the work is drawn by it toward the point where it undergoes 
impossibility. This experience is purely nocturnal..."38 Thus Blanchot 
begins the section of The Space of Literature which contains the pages he 
cautiously indicates, in his prefatory remark, as the center towards which 
the book moves — "Orpheus's Gaze:" Orpheus, a man who felt his 
solitude like a sledgehammer, who despite the marvelous ability to charm 
men and beasts, even inanimate objects, was drawn by the death of 
Eurydice to brave the perpetual night of Hades in the hope of bringing her 
back to the light. It is this "Orphic" experience which we must take up 
with, the author's experience of the gravity of the work; it is the 
experience of the circularity of fascination, of the constantly reinforcing 
cycle of the work's demand and the author's persistent movement towards 
the perpetually absent central point of the work. This is the experience of 
the night, the experience of the impossibility of the outside, as well as the 
experience of the necessary impossibility of the response to this exteriority 
— an experience which, as Bataille described it, is the "...summoning [of] a 
silence (which we| can only approach from the outside..."39 [t is an 
3&Space p. 163. 
^Georges Bataille, Guilty , trans. Bruce Boone (Venice, California: The Lapis Press, 
1988) p. 7. Additions mine. 
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experience which, if we are to discuss the extent to which Blanchot is able 
to transcend the gravity of his own work, we too must approach. 
It is an approach, however, which necessitates some care. Blanchot, 
in his discussion of the orphic experience, a discussion which elucidates the 
requirements of the work provisionally sketched in the discussion of the 
work's exteriority, turns away from a primarily theoretical discussion, to 
an examination of the writings, both public and private, of Kafka, 
Mallarme and Rilke. Blanchot takes up with these writers' various 
responses to the gravity of the work, in an attempt to expand his treatment 
of the work's demand: an expansion which takes the form of a meditation 
on impossibility — the impossibility of inauthenticity, of the interior, as 
well as an impossibility proper to the work's exteriority. It is this 
expansion which is of interest here; and yet, it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to engage Blanchot's interpretive discussion directly. Instead, we 
must look towards Blanchot's theoretical observations, those places where 
he moves between these writers' responses to the gravity of the work, to 
examine the differing senses of impossibility they describe. Unfortunately, 
this focus on theory runs the risk of misrepresenting an experience which 
is radically resistant to theory, not, of course, the resistance of the 
personal, the extent to which this experience, as private, is inaccessible to 
others, but the resistance of absence itself, the sense in which, as we have 
discussed, the disaster pre-empts any attempt to speak about it. It is 
necessary, then, if we are to follow Blanchot towards the work's orphic 
space, to refer constantly to the preliminary approach to this space 
described in the last section. It is only from within the topography 
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established by this first discussion of the problem that it is possible to 
situate the expansion which the discussion of Orpheus's gaze is. 
It is the death of Eurydice which strips Orpheus, exposing him to the 
pull of the underworld, and it is with death, or at least the author's 
fascination with it, that Blanchot begins his approach to the work's orphic 
zero-point. Starting from the recognition that being has, as both its limit 
and its source, the nothingness which is death, the fact that I can "not 
be,"40 Blanchot points towards the author's fear of her mortality, fear not 
so much of not existing, but rather of the imperviousness of death, its 
resistance to understanding, as that which first draws her toward the work: 
As long as I live, I am a mortal man; but when I 
die, ceasing to be a man, I also cease to be mortal, 
I am no longer able to die and I am horrified...for 
I see it as it is: no longer death, but the 
impossibility of dying.41 
In this inability to die, we see the first impossibility of the author's 
response to death, the sense in which it is not dying which fascinates the 
author — in which she feels the demand that she write ~ but the realization 
^This is, of course, a recognition which resonates throughout Twentieth century 
European philosophy, especially in the work of Heidegger, "Death is the shrine of 
Nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that merely exists, but 
which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself." Martin Heidegger, 
"The Thing," in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper 
Row, 1971) p. 178. 
4'Blanchot, La part du feu (Paris: Gallimard, 1949) p. 359. As quoted in "White 
Writing," Roger Laporte, Diacritics vol. 7, no. 2 Summer 1977, p. 35. 
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that death, though in some sense the condition of the artistic experience, 
itself lies somewhere outside of experience, forever beyond the author's 
power. In this recognition lies the ruin of writing; the horror of an 
impersonal death, of a death that I cannot die, subverts any presumption of 
power on the part of the author, negates any purposeful activity before 
such activity is begun. At least at this first level of the author's impossible 
response to the work, however, this negation remains only provisional. 
For, the impossibility of the "I cannot die" is primarily 
epistemological, it stands only as the limit of the author's knowledge; as 
such, it offers itself to some sort of a definitive resolution: it stands as only 
one more barrier for the interiorizing power of Literature. This is the 
response of the author, who, confronted with the sheer excessiveness of 
death, the extent to which it is always other than being, writes in the 
attempt to domesticate death, to bring it within the realm of her 
experience: 
The writer, then, is one who writes in order to be 
able to die, and he is one whose power comes 
from an anticipated relationship with death.42 
This is the experience of the author who, with Kafka, writes in order to be 
able to "die content;" it is an experience which, in the author's need to 
know death, to make it her own, bears a certain resemblance to suicide. 
42Ibid„ p. 53. 
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On the surface, both suicide and writing purport to accomplish 
something, both seek to exert a certain control over death: suicide, by 
making death yet one more task which the subject can perform, and 
writing, which seeks to end its quest for Truth in death. And yet, each 
must ultimately be considered as failing to do so.; both suicide and this 
traditional notion of writing are attempts to represent an extreme situation; 
they are reactions to the experience of absence, an experience which seems 
to encourage an expression of power, but which the profundity of this 
absence renders problematic, "Both involve a power that wants to be a 
power even in the region of the ungraspable, where the domain of goals 
ends."43 This suicide, this writing, are not, of course, the self-destruction 
Blanchot indicates is the authentic relationship of the author to death. For, 
in this desire for an impossible power, in the attempt to reduce the limit 
which death's absence draws to an epistemological obstruction, we 
recognize the interior: ultimately, this desire is a desire to retain a certain 
presence, a certain self in the anonymity of the exterior. It is, however, an 
attempt which, for Blanchot, points towards the outside. 
In her failure to overcome what would seem to be the limit of 
writing, the sheer excessiveness of death's exteriority, the author feels a 
strong attraction: 
It seems that Kafka recognized in precisely this 
terrible state of self-dissolution, where he is lost 
43Ibid., p. 94. 
for others and for himself, the center of gravity 
of writing's demand...44 
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With this recognition, we begin to recognize a response to death's 
transgressive power which is faithful to the exterior; rather than an 
experience of an epistemological impossibility, an impossibility which is 
thus penetrable by reason, Kafka's experience of this "horrible state of self-
dissolution" is an experience of the impenetrability of the void, an 
experience of the profound emptiness of the image: 
...it is correct to say that the artist's experience is 
an ecstatic experience and that it is...an experience 
of death. To see properly is essentially to die. It 
is to introduce into sight the turning back again 
which is ecstasy and which is death.45 
This ecstatic experience of death is, at least apparently, an experience of 
surrender to death's gravity; Kafka's vision offers not the ability to die, but 
the ecstasy of fascination: the necessity of re-approaching death's 
impossibility. 
In this re-approach, it is possible to discern an important difference 
between suicide and writing. Suicide, for all of its despair of the world, 
remains part of it; to the end, suicide retains the character of an act, and 
^Space , p. 62. 
45lbid., p. 151. 
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thus asserts a certain productivity - until death surprises the suicide, she 
still hopes to accomplish the production of her own death. The author, on 
the other hand, necessarily turns away from this fictive production; 
compelled by the absent work, she "...wants, so to speak, to install [herself], 
to dwell in this absence."46 it js no longer her own personal death which 
attracts the writer; she turns instead to the possibility of death, to the death 
which is everyone's. However, though this re-approach to the work's 
absence seems at first a faithful response to the needs of the work's 
exteriority, this turning back, though not an attempt to overcome this 
absence, remains an attempt on the part of the author to retain a privileged 
position with regards to it. 
For, the death which is no longer mine has a certain potential; its 
universality has a definitiveness which seems almost to be an affirmation, a 
definitiveness which speaks strongly to the author: 
...if death is true, if it is a genuine act...the 
supreme possibility...then the negation that 
operates in words, and 'this drop of nothingness' 
which is the presence of consciousness in us, the 
death from which we derive the power not to be 
which is our essence, also partake of truth. They 
bear witness to something definitive; the function 
to 'set a limit upon the infinite' And so the work, 
which is linked to the purity of negation, can in its 
turn arise in the certainty of that distant Orient 
^Ibid., p. 107. 
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Orient which is its origin.47 
In death's universality, in the inescapable fact that "everyone dies," seems 
finally to lie the truth which can empower the author, enabling her to 
overcome the horrible gravity of death's impossibility. It is an absence 
which can be purified, which can be used as a weapon against that other 
absence: the terrible effacing presence of the outside. 
Recognizing the futility of attempting to overcome death, the author 
looks to death's truth, its purity as essence, as an entry to the outside ~ not 
to close it off, to overcome its exteriority, but to become its interior, to 
dwell in it, to move with familiarity within it: 
In the work, the artist protects himself not only 
against the world, but also against the requirement 
that draws him out of the world. The work 
momentarily domesticates this 'outside' by 
restoring an intimacy to it. The work silences and 
gives the intimacy of silence to this outside bereft 
of intimacy and repose...48 
This intimacy characterizes the second sense of the interior's impossible 
response to the work. To the extent that the ecstatic experience of death 
seems to provide the space for an affirmation by the author, the extent to 
47Ibid„ p. 110. 
^Ibid., p. 53. 
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which it seems to offer the power to domesticate the outside, this turning 
towards, like the attempt to overcome death's absence, remains an 
inauthentic response to the gravity of the outside. The movement towards 
death's essence makes of the exterior merely a privileged mode of the 
interior; thus purified, death is not only completely penetrable by the 
author, but stands as a ground for her ~ what once loomed as the author's 
undoing now becomes that which shelters her from exteriority. 
Thus we begin to understand the fascination of death, and with it, the 
demand of the work. The absence which is death, those "drops of 
nothingness" which stand as the limit of the author's experience, also seem 
to proffer a certain power. It seems possible, at least at first, that this 
absence can be erased; that it is possible, through some definitive act, that 
the author can survive death — perhaps not by living past it, but by 
bringing it within her experience through her artistry: 
At such moments writing is [more than] a 
compelling call; it is not waiting upon grace, or 
an obscure prophetic achievement, but something 
simpler, more immediately pressing: the hope of 
not going under, the hope of sinking faster than 
[oneself] and thus of catching a hold of [oneself] at 
the last minute.49 
This hope is, of course, a vain one; the outside which is death is the 
49ibid., p. 63. Additions mine. 
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impossibility of such a feat. However, with the recognition, in the face, 
and perhaps because of, the impossibility of this act, of death's universality, 
comes the infinitely more dangerous hope of purifying death: 
...it is a task which consists, not in surrendering to 
Being's unresolvable ambiguity, but in giving it 
decisiveness, exactitude and form...in lifting the 
uncertainty of anguish to the resolution of an 
exact formulation.50 
This attempt to give form to death, which is the attempt to make of death a 
shelter against the demand of the outside, is an indication of what Blanchot, 
elsewhere in The Space of Literature, describes as fascination's threat, the 
tendency to move determinately to the void, thus threatening its being as 
indeterminacy. It is easy to recognize the allure of this power to "set a 
limit upon nothingness," its promise to give the author the ability to tap 
into the transgressive potential of the void; it is a promise fulfilled, 
however, only at the cost of this potential -- the work is lost, survived only 
by the gravity of the book. 
The attraction of the work, the fascination proper to the outside, 
encourages no such expression of power; Eurydice does not call Orpheus to 
the underworld, demanding that he make it another realm of the world — 
he is drawn out of his solitude not by her voice but by her absence. This is 
the key to the work's demand; to be fascinated is not to be beguiled by the 
^Ibid., p. 144. 
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outside, by the power which death seems to proffer; rather, it is to 
experience the empty presence of the outside while recognizing that one is 
never present to it or in it. Far from encouraging the writer to overcome 
the void, the demand of the work is the proclamation of its openness, its 
"inexhaustible negative depth"; an openness which is the work's complete 
indifference to the author's power, "Whoever believes he is attracted finds 
himself profoundly neglected. "51 The work is this marvelous simplicity of 
an opening which offers nothing but the infinite void that opens beneath the 
author, the indifference which greets her with silence ~ a silence too 
insistent to be resisted and to resistant to be analyzed. We must look, then, 
for the experience of this fascination not in the articulations of the author's 
power, but in her necessarily inattentive movement towards the works 
silent demand. 
The experience of this fascination proper to the work is the 
experience of the night. We must be careful, however; there is a 
difference between the welcoming night of death, the night in which power 
reigns, and the impenetrable blackness of the void — the night of the 
outside. That this difference is discernible should not surprise us; death is, 
as Blanchot points out, a nocturnal experience: 
This is the first night. Here absence approaches -
silence, repose,night...here the sleeper does not 
know he sleeps, and he who dies goes to meet real 
dying...The first night is welcoming...of it one 
5lIbid., p. 170. 
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can say, In the night, as if it had an intimacy. We 
enter into the night and rest there, sleeping and 
dying.52 
We are already aware of the dangers of this night, the trap which this 
welcome hides. It is the night of the day which, with its omnipresent light 
(the traditional light of reason) promises shelter and Truth. It is this night 
which threatens the work's exteriority; and yet, it is this night which 
Blanchot feels it is necessary for the author to enter. Not to dwell within, 
to make it her own, but to wait, like Thomas in Thomas the Obscure, for a 
call; for it is only here, at this night's most extreme point, that the author, 
"...hears at a certain moment the other night...and the void is now a 
presence coming toward" her.53 This call is the experience of the absent 
central point of the work - the experience of the openness of the outside -
the work's demand. 
It is an experience, then, not of the powerful and determinate silence 
of the day, the quiet of the book, but of the solitude and silence of the 
approach of the outside, of the work's interminable murmuring: 
He who, having entered the first night, seeks 
intrepidly to go toward its profoundest intimacy, 
toward the essential, hears at a certain moment the 
other night - hears himself, hears the eternally 
reverberating echo of his own step, a step toward 
52Ibid., p. 163. 
53Ibid„ p. 169. 
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Blanchot labels this night "nuit blanche "55; it is the white night of the void 
which the author experiences as a commanding silence. There is still the 
sense in which we must describe this experience of this silence as a 
movement toward's the work's absence, and thus, as a response conditioned 
by a certain impossibility; this is not, however, an impossibility of the 
interior, but of the outside - it is a movement characterized not by purpose, 
but by inertia; the author moves towards the outside not because she is 
lured by the promise of power, but precisely because she no longer has the 
power to resist. This is the Orphic experience; it is an experience of 
surrender, of submitting, through the perpetual turning towards the 
essential, to the work's inessentiality. In this incessant return to the 
inessential, we recognize the work's demand, the nocturnal experience of 
the work's impossibility — a silence which, "...has no power, it does not 
call, it attracts only by negligence.."56 it is a recognition, however, which 
remains only partial; the author's response to this demand, though indicated 
indirectly, needs to be discussed with greater care. 
As we have seen, the orphic movement toward the work's absent 
center, the author's reply to the call of the outside, has as its goal not the 
impossible task of sustaining the outside, of somehow ensuring its 
^Ibid., p. 169. 
^Blanchot, "Discours sur la patience" p. 22. Quoted in Taylor, Altarity, p. 244. 
56Space , p. 170. 
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exteriority (a task which we recognize is as unnecessary to the work as it is 
impossible,) but of giving a form, through language, to this absence, "To 
write is to produce the work's absence (worklessness)"57 Unlike the 
impossible sustaining of the work's exteriority, this is a task which seems to 
be within the author's power; as the example of Orpheus indicates, it is 
possible for the author, through her artistry, to approach the central point 
of the work (and this is perhaps more important) to bring it with her into 
the definitiveness of the day. It is a return, however, which is possible 
only with a certain inattentiveness, "...only by turning away from it. This 
turning away is the only way it [the work's central point] can be 
approached. "58 in this inattentiveness we recognize a subject stripped of 
her presence by the non-space and non-time of the work; in the place and 
time of the work's endless silent murmuring - the white noise of this white 
night - there is no production, "It is the depths of being's inertia 
[desoeuvrement 'J."59 jn this turning away of the author , her "can't 
work," is the limit of the possibility to even talk of an author; no longer a 
subject, the author is nameless, powerless, in the presence of the work's 
absence. And yet, despite this, Blanchot indicates that there remains a 
certain necessary movement which the work demands the author make. 
The orphic experience, then, describes not only the turning away 
which is the author's impossible response to the work's demand, but also an 
^Blanchot, La part dufeu , from Laporte, "White Night" p. 61. 
5&Space , p. 171. Additions mine. 
^Ibid., p. 46. 
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expression of power which the work's impossibility demands: the incessant 
return, despite the outside's effacing power, to the work's central point - a 
return which necessarily takes the form of an interruption. Orpheus, 
having risked his own life in the descent, had impossibly succeeded; 
remaining faithful to Pluto's demands, he led Eurydice out of the perpetual 
night of Tartarus. In the end, however, he could not resist the pull of her 
absence and, turning to look at her, he lost her to the night forever. It is in 
this failure that Blanchot positions the author; like Orpheus, the author 
cannot resist the demand of the outside, the demand that she move ever 
towards it. She cannot resist it because it is precisely this return which the 
work's exteriority necessitates. The gaze of Orpheus, the writer's return to 
the work, is, at the same time, the betrayal of the work - the abandonment 
of the essential inattention which the work, if it is to approach the day, 
requires - and the work's salvation — that which recognizes the needs of 
the work's exteriority and, by moving ever closer, propels the work ever 
farther outside: 
Orpheus's gaze is Orpheus's ultimate gift to the 
work. It is a gift whereby he refuses, whereby he 
sacrifices the work, bearing himself toward the 
origin...and whereby unknowingly he still moves 
toward the work, toward the origin of the 
work.60 
6°Ibid., p. 174. 
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This is the doubled demand of the work: that the author write in order to 
proclaim the work's absence, to form an absent meaning, but that she form 
it in such a way that its impossibility, this whitest night, shines through. 
Thus, it is exactly at the point where the work's absence makes work 
impossible that the author is commanded to the greatest impossibility; the 
author, denuded, shorn of every sign of her power, is nevertheless 
condemned by the work's need to a certain determinateness. Blanchot 
speaks of this exertion in terms of a certain powerlessness; however, as we 
have seen, it is exactly an expression of power which this determinateness 
requires, "I bring to the incessant speech the decisiveness, the authority of 
my silence. "61 Its expression may be necessarily sheltered, the language 
may be halting, lame, "essentially inessential," but the work compels the 
author to a certain formalism, demands that she impose a silence upon the 
interminable murmuring of the outside. In Bataille's words: 
This is how I finally reach the end of language, 
which is death. Potentially, the question's still one 
of language, but the meaning of this language 
(already meaning's absence) is implicit in words 
that put a stop to language. But these words 
acquire meaning only to the extent that they take 
place immediately before silence - a silence that 
puts a stop to them.62 
61 Ibid., p. 27. 
^Bataille, Guilty, p. 8. 
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It is with this silence, finally, that we understand the demand of the work 
and the author's response. The work's demand, in The Space of Literature, 
is a demand for an impossible expression of power on the part of the 
author; a demand which, while seemingly reinforcing the work's flight 
outside, actually subverts this exteriority. The impossibility of the author's 
response becomes all too possible. What we are left with, then, is not the 
silence of the void, the white noise of the work's outside, but the 
commanding silence of the author - her inattention transformed to a 
perhaps fatal, attentiveness. 
The problem of silence remains in The Writing of the Disaster ; 
however, rather than discussing the silence necessary to the work in terms 
of inattention, a discussion which has at its base an economy of power, 
Blanchot speaks to the outside's impossible demand for a witness in terms 
of passivity. We have, of course, seen this shift before; as I indicated in the 
last section, there is an important difference between the description of the 
work's demand in The Space of Literature and in The Writing of the 
Disaster — it is a difference which revolves around the presence of the 
disaster itself. Blanchot leaves behind the analysis of death and the night 
which never seemed to escape their traditional roles as disguises of the 
author's subjectivity, replacing them by the writing of the disaster, 
"...writing [which] continues by discontinuity; it is the lure of silence 
which, in very absence, has already delivered us to the disastrous 
return."63 Thus, Blanchot also leaves behind the doubled logic of the 
63 Writing , p. 56. 
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work's demand, upon the articulation of which The Space of Literature 
seems to stumble. Yet, as the "lure of silence" indicates, we have not left 
behind the demand; if anything, the author experiences the demand of the 
disaster as a more complete effacement — the disaster pushes beyond the 
author, beyond the point where it is even possible to speak of a response, to 
the other side, the outside which is the before of any interiority or 
exteriority. This is passivity: 
Passivity is measureless: for it exceeds being; it is 
being when being is worn down past the nub — 
the passivity of a past which has never been, come 
back again. It is the disaster defined ~ hinted at -
- not as an event of the past, but as the 
immemorial past (Le Tres-Haut) which returns, 
dispersing by its return the present, where, 
ghostly, it would be experienced as a return.64 
Thus we see the promise of passivity; in the face of the disaster there can 
be no power no activity — the author can do nothing but witness the 
disaster's unreachable exteriority. 
There is, thus, an impossibility of disaster, an impossibility of 
passivity — an impossibility not of response, of a certain necessary 
expression of power, but an impossibility of passivity: 
^Ibid., p. 17. 
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Accept this distinction: 'it is necessary' and not 
'you must' — perhaps because the second formula 
is addressed to a you and the first is an 
affirmation outside law, without legality, an 
unnecessary necessity. All the same, an 
affirmation? a manifestation of violence? I seek a 
passive 'it is necessary,' worn out by patience.65 
This "wearing out" is the key to passivity; with it, Blanchot hopes to 
describe an impossible witnessing which evades the seemingly necessary 
violence of the author's response. It differs precisely from the response 
described in The Space of Literature in the effacing power of the void; it 
is still possible, from the outside of the work's space and time, to discern 
an author. Such a perspective is impossible in the presence of the disaster; 
the disaster is the rejection of any such privileged position. And yet, 
despite the disaster's depersonalizing power, Blanchot still seeks to leave 
room for Orpheus; the question becomes, "How is it possible to think of the 
witness whose witnessing, whose passivity, the disaster seems to demand?" -
- it is a question whose necessarily indeterminate answer cannot be found in 
a discussion of the author's response, but must instead be looked for in the 
commanding presence of the outside. 
In a distinction which owes much to Levinas, Blanchot links this 
worn out "it is necessary" which is passivity, with the other: 
Through patience, I take upon myself the relation 
65ibid., p. 44. 
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to the other of the disaster ~ the relation which 
does not allow me to assume it, or even to remain 
myself in order to undergo it.66 
In the proximity of the other, a proximity which, for Levinas, precedes 
any unity of consciousness.67 Blanchot locates a demand which, coming 
before the self, radically opens the author, drawing her outwards, making 
her responsible for this otherness; it is a responsibility for a certain 
witnessing, an answer to the work's outside: 
...when passivity idles and destroys me, I am at 
the same time pressed into a responsibility which 
not only exceeds me, but which I cannot exercise, 
since I cannot do anything and no longer exist as 
myself. Such responsible passivity would be 
Speaking . For before anything is spoken, and 
outside of being...Speaking gives and gives the 
response, answering to the impossible and for the 
impossible.68 
66lbid., p. 14. It is impossible, within the confines of this paper, to elaborate on the 
connections between Levinas and Blanchot, not to mention the difficulties of attempting to 
summarize the work of as profound a thinker as Levinas. At best, I can hope to indicate 
some of the important consonances; consonances which hopefully illuminate Blanchot's 
notion of passivity. 
^Emmanuel Levinas, "Substitution," in The Levinas Reader , ed. by Sean Hand 
(Cambridge, MA.: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989) p. 90. 
68Writing , pp. 19-20. See also Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," in The Levinas 
Reader, p. 83 Crucial to the understanding of this responsibility is the recognition that 
both Blanchot and Levinas are concerned with the possibility of speaking after the 
Holocaust. In the silence imposed by the Holocaust, the silence of six million deaths, it is 
unclear that speach is ever again going to be possible. And yet, this silence is so horrible 
that it requires just that; Levinas (and more indirectly, Blanchot) trace a post-Auschwitz 
ethics: a critique of traditional, logocentric thought which recognizes subjectivity only as a 
hostage to the other — the face of the other as the face of the murdered, the face which 
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The presence of the other, the presence which is the coming before of the 
work, is a weight which the author cannot escape. The demand of the 
disaster is the demand for this speech, a speech which, in its speaking, 
stands testimony to the effacing presence of the outside; it is a demand for 
speech which the other's proximity makes impossible to refuse, but whose 
force makes it impossible to speak. For, it is a speech without a speaker, a 
witnessing without a witness; the impossibility of the disaster is the 
impossibility of the writer writing ~ the impossibility of Orpheus. 
It is with this notion of the other, then, with the wearing, wearying 
presence of the disaster, that Blanchot seeks to escape the necessity of the 
work's demand. In the disaster, there is no longer any room to discuss the 
author's response — impossible of not — no room to write; there is only 
writing, writing which the transgressive presence of the other erases: 
Writing is per se already (it is still) violence: the 
rupture there is in each fragment, the break, the 
splitting, the tearing of the shred ~ acute 
singularity, steely point. And yet this combat is, 
for patience, debate. The name wears away, the 
fragment fragments, erodes.69 
In this paradox Blanchot locates both the needs of the work, the needs of 
the outside — a transcendence without an interior ~ and (this is the paradox 
refuses to be incorporated or thematized. 
69Writing , p. 46. 
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which gives the first one its force) the needs of the writer. What remains 
to be discussed is the gravity of this paradox: whether is has the 
catastrophic, excessive energy necessary to propel Blanchot outwards or 
whether, in his need to write, he falls prey to the obscene fascination of 
exteriority. 
II 
All letters give form to absence. 
Edmond Jabes 
Thus Jabes, in The Book of Questions, gives expression to the act of 
writing — an expression in which we can recognize Blanchot's non-answer to 
the question about which both The Space of Literature and The Writing of 
the Disaster circulate: "What is it about the void, about the 'inexhaustible 
negative depth' of language, about the disaster, that moves, and in a sense 
compels, a person to write?" For Blanchot, this expression indicates both the 
author's dangerous power and that which allows her to escape it; for, the 
power of letters, the formalism which leads to a necessary re-interiorization 
on the absent presence of the work's exteriority, is also the possibility of 
writing. In this possibility lies the presence of the demand, the effacing 
presence of the outside which, coming before the author, calls her into 
writing. It is for this reason that Blanchot, recognizing the dangers writing 
poses to the outside, still writes: he feels the need to write, the demanding 
presence of the otherness of exteriority, too strongly; he must, in the end, 
forget the inactivity necessary to the exterior. Because of this sensitivity to 
the work's call, however, Blanchot cannot resist the work's gravity; opened 
by the exterior's demand, he is also opened to the attraction of exteriority: an 
attraction which produces a certain violence, an affirmation which threatens 
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to overcome the outside. 
For, what is the "need to write," the need felt by the author, stripped of 
her subjectivity, to silence the "incessant and the interminable," but the 
halting of language's spread outwards, the bounding of discourse by the 
authority of the author's silence which, no matter how lightly or 
transparently it defines, necessarily creates of the outside merely another 
mode of the interior? The passive activity of the author in the presence of 
the absence of the work, the extent to which the otherness of the work 
creates, while obviating, the solitude of the other, is the mark not only of the 
work's indeterminacy, of its never-ceasing flight outwards, but also of its 
final, fatal completion. The Noli Me Legere is not only the sign of the 
work's fundamental difference from the author, but its inescapable, de trop, 
sameness; in its incomprehensibility, the work stands as the only monument 
to the author's denuded subjectivity, it is an accretion of her power. As such, 
it is a positivity that, while a response to the demanding presence of the 
work's absence, can respond only by negating this absence. The fascination 
felt by the author, the allure of the image, is the need to write; a need that, in 
the exertion which attempts to satisfy it, threatens the work's exteriority. 
It is a threat which Blanchot is all too aware that he can not avoid. 
Though, as he recognizes, this attempted satisfaction, the circularity of 
fascination, serves to reinforce the work's flight outwards, in the end the 
author's power, as concretized in the work, overcomes her deterritorializing 
influence. Blanchot recognizes that even in his work there is a certain 
determinateness which haunts it: 
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I believe that these texts, with an obstinacy that 
today astounds me, have not refrained from 
seeking to respond even to the book's absence that 
they designate in vain.70 
In this observation of the work's perversity, we seem to have come to a limit 
beyond which it is no longer possible to write: the stubborn formalism of 
the work seems to condemn writing to the interior. This recognition, 
however, inspires in Blanchot not the renunciation of writing, but a certain 
cautious resolve. Even in the face of the author's seemingly inescapable 
power, both The Space of Literature and The Writing of the Disaster 
evidence a certain optimism; not the Panglossian optimism of Reason, sure 
in its ability to find truth ~ an optimism which the horror of the disaster, the 
"suffering such that I could not suffer it,"71 renders impossible — but the 
optimism of the author, the hope that she can be faithful, that with caution, 
she can be true to the demands of the work while also respecting its 
exteriority. 
This is not thus an optimism of an eventual production, the hope that 
somehow the author, escaping the work's gravity, can complete the work, 
encircle it with her witnessing; Blanchot's hope is the hope of inertia, of the 
desperate return to the work's central point. When language arrives at its 
own edge, what it finds is not a positivity which contradicts it, a productivity 
^Blanchot, L'Entretien infini, p. 637. Though the texts of which Blanchot speaks are 
The Space of Literature, and the fictional and critical works preceding and immediately 
succeeding it, despite the more careful treatment of the question of the work's demand in 
The Writing of the Disaster, the observation of this obstinacy extends to this work also. 
7 t Writing, p. 14, 
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which will somehow give it foundation, but the void that effaces it. It is an 
optimism, then, of despair, of the incessant return to the work's 
indeterminacy, the hope that finally, at the work's before, the author can 
escape the work's gravity. We see this optimism in The Space of Literature 
in the experience of Orpheus, in Orpheus's gift to the work -- the inattentive 
attentiveness — the force necessary to the circle of fascination which 
ultimately, is insufficient to the work's exteriority. We see it also in The 
Writing of the Disaster, in the assertion that despite writing's violence, 
despite "the rupture there is in each fragment," still, "the fragment 
fragments;" that is, that the exteriority of the work, its solitary being, 
overcomes the formalism which this being demands. 
As expressed in The Writing of the Disaster then, it is an optimism 
which exceeds this notion of a gift; exceeds it with the disaster — with the 
impossibility of passivity.72 In this "It is necessary" Blanchot locates the 
absent author — an author from which no response to the work's demand is 
possible. We are still left, however, with the question of Blanchot's resolve, 
a resolve which despite the fragmenting power of the outside, its demand 
that language enter the void, consenting to be undone in the interminable 
murmuring of an outside where words endlessly unravel, remains the attempt 
to impose a certain silence upon the "spreading outwards" of language. To 
72fhis discussion of the gift brings to mind Bataille's use of the term "expenditure" to 
designate unproductive, transgressive forms of production. Though this strays somewhat 
from the question at hand, it seems necessary to indicate that, though Blanchot was 
heavily influenced by Bataille and most likely understood Orpheus's gift as just this sort 
of non-productive sacrifice, the activity which he would like to reserve for the author in 
The Space of Literature seems to preclude such an expenditure. This sense of 
transgression does, however, have a place in The Writing of the Disaster in the work's 
gift to the author — the pre-original rupture which is her responsibility. 
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negate one's own discourse as Blanchot does, is to cast language ceaselessly 
outside of itself, to deprive it at every moment of the very ability to speak; 
and yet, the demand of the outside is a demand for just that — speech about 
the disaster, speech without a subject, perhaps, but testimony nonetheless. 
Blanchot looks to fascination, to the compelling call of the outside, to 
explain this resolve. The call faithful to the outside is less than a certain 
attentiveness to the call of Eurydice, a turning towards the forbidden face 
that has already concealed itself. It is instead an attentiveness which, not 
merely forsaking of the world for transcendence, is the realization of a space 
at the other end which, glittering darkly, is another language, a language 
without an assignable subject, a personal pronoun without a person. 
Recognizing that it is too much73 to rely on this orphic experience; Blanchot 
looks instead to the other, to the experience of a pre-original presence, 
which, opening up the author, both commands and repels her. The other acts 
both as a demand to which the author is never equal and a weight of which 
she would like to be rid. And yet, the author is bound to the other by a 
responsibility which is impossible to bear, but which she must draw ever 
closer to herself. For, the other is, herself, speechless; she is the nameless 
limit language reaches — she can speak only through the author. The call to 
witness is the call to let the other speak; this finally is the sense of the 
disaster's demand. "To read, to write, the way one lives under the disaster: 
-This is the "too much" of the author's excessive power, a power which establishes not 
an economy of expenditure, but of a certain dangerous conservation. See Bataille, "The 
Notion of Expenditure," in Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927-1939. Ed. Allan 
Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985) pp. 118-119. 
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exposed to the passivity that is outside passion...It is not you who will speak; 
let the disaster speak in you..."74 
There is a certain ethical necessity to this call, the voicelessness of the 
outside commands in a way that we cannot refuse; it is to this necessity that 
Blanchot points as the source of his resoluteness: 
In the relation of myself to the Other, the Other 
exceeds my grasp...But, in the relation of the other 
to me, everything seems to reverse itself: the 
distant becomes the close-by, this proximity 
becomes the obsession that afflicts me, that weighs 
down upon me, that separates me from myself. 
And then, the other becomes the Overlord...he who 
overwhelms, encumbers, undoes me, he who puts 
me in his debt no less than he attacks me...by 
charging me with measureless 
responsibility...when passivity idles and destroys 
me, I am at the same time pressed into a 
responsibility which not only exceeds me, but 
which 1 cannot exercise, since I cannot do anything 
and no longer exist as myself. Such responsible 
passivity would be Speaking. 
In this tyranny of the other, then, Blanchot seeks that which would remove 
the author from her power, but would remove her in such a way that writing 
is still required of her. Levinas, in an analysis upon which Blanchot 
^Ibid., p. 4. 
75Ibid„ pp. 19-20. 
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draws,76 describes this removal in terms of an "an-archical" responsibility. 
Before consciousness, before intentionality, there is a direct sensuous contact 
with the Other; a contact which Levinas expresses as the "face-to-face." 
Thus, before ontology, before the thematizing act which is the erasure or 
overcoming of exteriority, there is an original openness, an openness which 
is the face of the other — an openness which is the demand for responsibility: 
Prior to the unveiling of Being in general, as the 
basis for knowledge and meaning of Being, there is 
a relationship with the existent which is expressed; 
before the ontological level, [there is] the ethical 
level. 
For Levinas, the face of the Other calls to us, demands our attention -
demands it in such a way that no response is possible. The relationship with 
the other is asymmetrical; the call the author feels obligates her insofar as 
that other is infinite vulnerability — a suffering which is beyond the author's 
power. 
In this asymmetricality, Blanchot recognizes a call which, beyond the 
author's possibility, nonetheless commands her. It is the annihilated and 
annihilating presence of the outside which demands a witness; a testimony 
which, coming from the author's before, is never discourse, but is always 
7^See Writing, p. 25. and the Translator's Notes, pp. 148-149 
77Levinas, Totality and Infinitx: An Essay on Exteriority, Trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969) p. 48. 
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somehow ahead of it. This is the writing of the disaster; it is a language 
which, instead of attempting to represent the outside, to give form to it, flees 
from it, becoming in this flight exactly this rupturing presence. This is the 
language of Le souci de Voeuvre, a concern which is much less an activity 
than a certain subjectless, powerless, response to the void. The call for a 
witness, the concern for the work, is not then a call for an author as much as 
a call for passivity, for a responsibility which, exceeding the author, draws 
her outward into testimony. 
There is, however, a certain danger to this concern, the danger of 
erasing or overcoming the very absence which calls one to speak. The 
concern for the work encourages a certain seriousness, a seriousness which 
the annihilating suffering of the other seems to demand, but which all too 
closely resembles the seriousness of Reason, of the tradition of interiority; it 
is the severity of a thought which locates its necessity within itself, finding 
in this totalizing gaze its unity and its difference. This is not of course to 
suggest that Blanchot's notion of witnessing shares in the bloated, self-
important, gravity of interiority; however, the violence demanded by the 
"need to write," the silence which this witnessing commands, threatens 
exteriority with its necessity, with its undeniable call. 
Jean Baudrillard, in his book Fatal Strategies makes a distinction 
which resonates interestingly with the differentiations I have made between 
the dominating tendencies of the interior and this inescapable gravity of 
exteriority. Baudrillard, standing witness, from his peculiar, descriptive 
theoretical position, of the flight outwards of language, discusses the flows 
of interiorization in terms of obscenity. For Baudrillard, the obscene is the. 
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"....loss of illusion, play and scene;" that is, the loss/negation of absence in 
favor of the "reality" of the interior. This loss takes two forms, 
corresponding to the logic (or anti-logic) of its realm of expression. In the 
interior, according, then, to traditional discourse, "The obscene is what is 
neither visible, nor representable, and thus possesses an energy of rupture, of 
transgression, and a hidden violence."78 The obscene is the disguised 
presence of the metaphysical tradition at the roots of language, the hidden 
violence of which extends beyond the elements of language to the forms of 
expression which the language takes. 
In the exterior, "Our own radical obscenity is no longer that of the 
hidden and the repressed, it is the transparency of the [exterior| itself."79 
Obscenity, then, is the "more visible than the visible." This is the obscenity 
of the careless response to the fascination of absence: 
Obesity of naming systems, of information stocks 
that are henceforth no longer treatable — obesity, 
the saturation of a system of nuclear destruction 
now exceeding its own ends, excrescent, 
hypertelic.80 
An obscene writing characterized by a cancerous excess; a writing which 
7^Jean Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, Trans. Philip Beitchman and W.G.J. Niesluchowski 
(New York: Semiotext(e). 1990) p. 64. 
79lbid., p. 64. Additions mine. 
80Ibid„ p. 25. 
64 
escapes into the ellipsis of forms and movements ~ movements from growth 
to excrescence, from finality to hypertely. This is also the obscenity of the 
need to write, of a writing frantic with its own need, "Everyone must deliver 
his secret, cross the threshold of silence and enter the immanent space of 
communication..."81 in this space of communication is the presumption of 
the book, its claim to Truth and completion. There is then, a "white 
obscenity" which constrains the witnessing of the exterior, threatening 
always to revert this witnessing to the logic of the 'black obscenity' of the 
interior. These are the dangers of writing; the danger that all writing 
succumbs to the gravity of the obscene, has the same tendency to erase 
difference and re-interiorize on the presence of absence — dangers which 
even the most careful witness of exteriority must risk. 
It is this white obscenity, the possibility that the author's need to write 
will overcome the work's exteriority, relegating it to the communicative, 
which threatens the work's nuit blanche. It is a possibility which Blanchot 
acknowledges, but never without holding out the quite possibly vain hope 
that the commanding presence of the outside will circumvent it. Indeed, in 
the rupturing address of the other Blanchot seems to find that which would 
support this hope: the recognition that witnessing re-inscribes the work's 
gravity, that in its fragmentation, it is this address: 
The fragment, as fragments, tends to dissolve the 
totality which it presupposes and which it carries 
81 Ibid., p. 59. 
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off toward the dissolution from which it does not 
(properly speaking) form, but to which it exposes 
itself in order, disappearing to maintain itself as 
the energy of disappearing: a repetitive energy, the 
limit that bears upon limitation — or the presence 
of the work of art's absence (to say it all again and 
to silence by saying it again).82 
And yet, it is this address only in its silencing power, its necessary violence. 
This is a hope of desperation, the hope of a person who, exposed to the 
solitude of the outside — its pain — , "...can no longer appeal to any ethics, 
any experience, any practice whatsoever — save that of some counter-living, 
which is to say an un-practice, or (perhaps) a word of writing."83 Though it 
seems that writing, even the subject-less witnessing which is Blanchot's most 
careful treatment of the work's demand, necessarily re-interiorizes on the 
work's absent presence, the risk of this white obscenity is one Blanchot 
willingly takes. For, not only is it the possibility of writing, but silence 
would be a greater violence: 
...language can only indefinitely tend towards 
justice by acknowledging the violence within it...if 
light is the element of violence, one must combat it 
with a certain other light, in order to avoid the 
worst violence, the violence of the night which 
preceded or presupposes discourse.34 
^Writing, pp. 60-61. 
83[bid., p. 26. 
^•Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," p. 117. 
